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InTroduCTIon
In the ever-growing and ever-expanding global economy of this 
ever-shrinking world, one would think that simplicity might be a virtue 
extolled by all. When it comes to bilateral investment treaties, however, 
simplicity is the exception, not the rule.2 There are an estimated 2,700 
bilateral investment treaties in force,3 and the increasingly complex web 
overlaying the international investment community can make things, at 
the very least, difficult to navigate.4
A bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) is an agreement between two 
countries regarding the mutual promotion and protection of private 
investment by individuals and businesses of the States party to the 
treaty.5 Although each investment treaty is unique, a BIT will typically: 
define investment; set up grounds for admission to each country; deter-
mine the appropriate form of compensation should any investments be 
expropriated; provide for free transfer of funds; set up dispute settlement 
mechanisms (for both individuals and States); and require national treat-
ment, most-favored-nation treatment, and fair-and-equitable treatment.6
The purpose of the BIT is to attract and increase foreign investment.7 
One way bilateral investment treaties attract foreign direct investment 
is by creating a certain level of protection for the investors of each 
State involved.8 This is typically accomplished through a combination 
2 See suryA p. subeDI, InternAtIonAl Investment lAW: reconcIlInG polIcy AnD 
prIncIple 176 (2008) (describing the current state of law as a “messy morass” that 
requires synchronization now more than ever). 
3 See m. sornArAJAh, the InternAtIonAl lAW on ForeIGn Investment 172 (3d ed. 
2010) (emphasizing that bilateral investment treaties appear to have peaked in the mid 
1990’s and although new ones continue to be negotiated, it is at a much slower rate). 
4 See generally Scott Vesel, Clearing a Path Through a Tangled Jurisprudence: 
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 32 yAle J. Int’l l. 125 (2007) (clarifying the dense and often 
contradictory jurisprudence relating to the most-favored-nation clause’s application to 
dispute settlement provisions).
5 See What Are BITs?, unIteD nAtIons conFerence on trADe AnD Development, 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page1006.aspx, (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) 
(providing a basic explanation of bilateral investment treaties).
6 Id.
7 See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An 
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 hArv. Int’l 
l.J. 67, 111–12 (concluding that bilateral investment treaties substantially increase the 
amount of foreign direct investment flowing into States party to the treaty).
8 subeDI, supra note 1, at 86. 
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of national treatment, fair-and-equitable treatment, and most-favored-
nation treatment.9 The most-favored-nation (“MFN”) clause, which is a 
staple of most bilateral investment treaties,10 remained relatively uncon-
troversial until 2000.11 Although the application of MFN clauses to 
substantive provisions has long been accepted,12 in 2000, an arbitration 
panel stunned the international investment community and sparked a 
debate that has raged since. This debate involved whether MFN clauses 
allow claimants to access more favorable dispute settlement provisions 
in third party treaties.13
This Article will argue that MFN clauses can be appropriately 
invoked to import more favorable dispute settlement provisions of third 
party treaties under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“VCLT”), and should be invoked for this purpose. Part I of this Article 
will provide developmental history and jurisprudential background of 
the MFN clause. Part II will argue that the application of MFN clauses 
to dispute settlement provisions is in accord with Articles 31 and 32 of 
9 See sornArAJAh, supra note 2, at 201 (asserting that it is typical for a BIT to 
contain one article on standards of treatment, which then lists each type of treatment 
provided for in the treaty). 
10 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10, at 39 (1999), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/psiteiitd10v3.en.pdf (deeming the most-favored-nation clause a “core element of 
international investment agreements”).
11 Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002). Unless otherwise noted, all 
awards are available at http://italaw.com. 
12 See Berschader v. Russian Fed’n, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award of Apr. 21, 
2006, ¶ 179 (Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce) (declaring 
that “it is universally agreed that the very essence of an [sic] MFN provision in a 
BIT is to afford to investors all material protection provided by subsequent treaties”); 
see also Yas Banifatemi, The Emerging Jurisprudence on the Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment in Investment Arbitration, in Investment treAty lAW: current Issues 
III 241, 241–42 (Andrea K. Bjorklund et al. eds., 2009) (referring to most-favored-
nation’s application to classic substantive provisions as “straightforward”).
13 Compare, e.g., Zachary Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: 
Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails, 2 J. Int’l DIsp. settlement 97, 114 (2011) (insisting 
that extension of the most-favored-nation clause to dispute settlement provisions will 
“undermine the possibility of a valid and binding arbitration agreement” and permit 
tribunals to run amok with order and justice in the international investment arena), 
with, e.g., stephAn W. schIll, the multIlAterAlIzAtIon oF InternAtIonAl Investment 
lAW 193 (2009) (articulating that broad application of most-favored-nation clauses to 
dispute settlement provisions carries the goals of bilateral investment treaties forward).
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the VCLT, and that only these articles need be relied upon while inter-
preting treaties.14 Part III will demonstrate how proper treaty interpreta-
tion requires that States be held to the language of their treaties. Finally, 
this Article will conclude that the MFN clause is a proper vehicle for 
claimants to access more favorable dispute settlement provisions that 
will subsequently further the goals of bilateral investment treaties.
I. The Origins of the MFN Clause and Its Path to Dispute  
settlement Provisions
A typical MFN clause provides that States party to a treaty will pro-
vide treatment no less favorable than that offered to third parties.15 This 
provides a sense of stability and security for both investors and host 
States: investors know they will not be driven out of business simply 
because a host State grants more favorable treatment to third parties,16 
and host States take comfort in knowing that they can generally adjust 
their international investment policies without necessarily renegotiat-
ing every existing treaty.17 Where an important phrase is widely used, 
however, it is frequently misinterpreted and applied incorrectly.18
14 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31, 32, May 23, 1969, 1115 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
15 See, e.g., The 2004 Model Treaty between The Government of the United States 
of America and The Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment (2004) [hereinafter, U.S. Model BIT], available 
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf (“treatment no less 
favorable than it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any non-Party.”).
16 See subeDI, supra note 1, at 68 (explaining that “foreign investors seek protection 
under the MFN principle to avoid any discrimination against them which would put 
them at a competitive disadvantage compared to other investors from third countries”). 
17 See Vesel, supra note 3, at 142–43 (elaborating that one-step revision of 
international investment by States inherently favors liberalization of investment policy 
because to tighten a policy, States would have to rework each treaty).
18 See Stanley K. Hornbeck, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause: Part One, 3 Am. 
J. Int’l l. 395, 395 (1909) (internal quotations omitted) (“Rarely does a conditional 
provision so extensively used and so vital in its bearing upon economic relations escape 
misinterpretation and avoid becoming the source of misunderstanding. The experience 
of the most-favored-nation clause has been no exception to the rule.”).
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It is a long accepted practice that MFN treatment refers to substan-
tive provisions included in bilateral investment treaties.19 Debates arise, 
however, over the applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement 
provisions. Examples of dispute settlement provisions typically found 
in bilateral investment treaties that a party might try to access through 
a MFN clause in the basic treaty are: a lack of or limited provision 
for arbitration of disputes, applicable arbitral rules or institutions, a 
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies prior to arbitration, barring 
arbitration if local remedies are first taken, or the passage of a “cooling 
period” prior to international arbitration.20
Though the basic concept behind the MFN clause remains the same, 
there are generally four types of MFN clauses that appear in bilateral 
investment treaties.21 First are clauses that explicitly affirm they are 
intended to apply to dispute settlement provisions.22 Second are Broad 
Clauses that refer generally to “all matters,” “all rights,” or “treatment,” 
without express mention of dispute settlement provisions.23 The third 
19 See Berschader v. Russian Fed’n, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award of Apr. 21, 
2006, ¶ 179 (Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce) (declaring 
that “it is universally agreed that the very essence of an [sic] MFN provision in a BIT 
is to afford to investors all material protection provided by subsequent treaties”).
20 See sornArAJAh, supra note 2, at 216–19 (offering several examples of dispute 
settlement provisions and their purposes). 
21 See Vesel, supra note 3, at 184 (highlighting the importance of determining the 
type of clause existing in the basic treaty when analyzing a tribunal’s reasoning); 
AnDreW neWcombe & lluís pArADell, lAW AnD prActIce oF Investment treAtIes: 
stAnDArDs oF treAtment 205 (2009) (suggesting that most bilateral investment treaties 
follow Broad and Narrow clauses, which do not clarify the scope of the most-favored-
nation clause). But see Noah Rubins, MFN Clauses, Procedural Rights, and a Return 
to Treaty Text, 213, 216 in Investment treAty ArbItrAtIon AnD InternAtIonAl lAW 
(T.J. Grierson Weiler, ed. 2008) (classifying most-favored-nation clauses into three 
distinct types: limited, general and broad).
22 E.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and The Government of [Country] for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, art. 3(3) (2005) (amended 2006) [hereinafter U.K. Model 
BIT], reprinted in zAchAry DouGlAs, the InternAtIonAl lAW oF Investment clAIms 
559 (2009) (clarifying that the most-favored-nation clause applies to each article 
contained in the treaty).
23 E.g., Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005), 20 IcsID rev. 262 (2005) (“treatment which 
is not less favorable”); Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 IcsID rep. 396 (2002) (“all matters relating 
to”).
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type are Narrow Clauses—perhaps containing non-exhaustive lists—
that make no specific reference to dispute settlement provisions.24 The 
fourth type of clause expressly prohibits application to dispute settle-
ment provisions.25 However, this does not mean that a clause that clearly 
prohibits the application of the MFN clauses to dispute settlement pro-
visions should be applied as such. But where there is ambiguity—in 
Broad and Narrow clauses—the clauses can and should be determined 
to apply to dispute settlement provisions. Although both the Broad and 
Narrow Clauses can be interpreted to allow for the MFN clause appli-
cation to dispute settlement provisions, Broad Clauses are easiest to 
extend in this manner.26
A. Groundwork Laid by Early Jurisprudence
The question of MFN clause application to dispute settlement provi-
sion did not arise during its initial foray into the international invest-
ment field.27 Rather, a series of cases created the early jurisprudence that 
eventually led to the question before the international legal and invest-
ment community. In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.,28 the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) for the first time, in dicta, relied on a party’s intent when 
interpreting the meaning and scope of the MFN clause.29 This case also 
created the vocabulary that is still commonly used when discussing 
24 E.g., North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1103(1)–(2), U.S.-Can.-Mex., 
Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (providing non-exhaustive lists 
of specific situations in which most-favored-nation treatment should be accorded to 
investors and investments, without mentioning dispute settlement mechanisms).
25 E.g., Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, 
43 I.L.M. 514 (2004) (prohibiting most-favored-nation treatment application to World 
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement actions).
26 See Vesel, supra at note 3, at 185 (imploring tribunals to respect parties’ clearly 
demonstrated intentions in the first and fourth examples).
27 The first BIT was signed in 1959 between Pakistan and Germany. The first claim 
brought seeking to extend the most-favored-nation clause of a BIT to dispute settlement 
provisions did not occur until 2000. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 IcsID rep. 396 (2002).
28 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment on Preliminary Objection, 1952 
I.C.J. 93 (July 22).
29 Id. at 106–07. The ICJ ultimately dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 114.
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MFN clauses and bilateral investment treaties.30 The ICJ continued to 
shape MFN clause interpretation in Rights of U.S. Nationals,31 holding 
that, so long as both the basic treaty and the third party treaty were 
valid and in force,32 the claimant could easily invoke the most exten-
sive privileges provided in third party treaties in the matter of consular 
jurisdiction.33 Finally, in the Ambatielos Case,34 the ICJ, applying the 
esjudem generis35 principle, concluded that: “[I]t cannot be said that the 
administration of justice, in so far as it is concerned with the protec-
tion of these rights [of traders], must necessarily be excluded from the 
field of application of the MFN clause, when the latter includes ‘all 
matters relating to commerce and navigation.’”36 This language created 
the basis for many of the modern arbitration panels to conclude that the 
MFN clause applies to dispute settlement provisions.37
30 The ICJ used the term “basic” to describe the treaty containing the most-favored-
nation clause that was being invoked, id. at 109; the term “juridical link” to describe 
the connection between the claimant and the third party treaty created by the most-
favored-nation clause, id.; and the phrase “confers upon that State the rights enjoyed 
by a third party” to describe the effect of an most-favored-nation clause, id.
31 Rights of Nat’ls of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 
I.c.J. 93, 176 (Aug. 27).
32 See id. at 224 (detailing that both treaties must be valid as a prerequisite to 
extending most-favored-nation treatment).
33 See id. at 187 (recognizing that provisions contained in the basic treaty “enured 
automatically and immediately to the benefit of the other Powers by virtue of the 
operation of the most-favoured nation clauses”).
34 Ambatielos Case (Gr. v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 91, 106 (Mar. 6, 1956) (claiming that 
Greece had not been afforded treatment in accord with “justice,” “right,” “equity,” and 
the “principles of international law” that had been assured to nations of other States).
35 Esjudem generis is “[a] canon of construction holding that when a general word or 
phrase follows a list of specific words, the general word or phrase will be interpreted 
to include only items of the same type as those listed.” blAck’s lAW DIctIonAry 594 
(9th ed. 2009). The esjudem generis principle essentially restricts any broad words or 
phrases by the preceding list. Id. The International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft 
Articles on Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to the UN General Assembly endorsed the 
doctrine of esjudem generis when interpreting most-favored-nation clauses. Draft 
Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, 30 y.b. Int’l l. comm’n 27 (1978), 
Commentary to Articles 9 and 10, ¶ 1.
36 Ambatielos, 12 R.I.A.A. at 107.
37 See Abby Cohen Smutny & Lee A. Steven, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause: 
What are its Limits?, in ArbItrAtIon unDer InternAtIonAl Investment AGreements: A 
GuIDe to the key Issues 351, 362 (Katia Yannaca-Small, ed. 2010) (indicating that the 
acceptance of “administration of justice” as referring to dispute settlement provisions 
has not be universal). 
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B. The First Crack in Tradition
The MFN clause lay relatively dormant in terms of discussion until 
Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain38 in 2000. For the first time, a claimant 
used the MFN clause of the basic treaty to circumvent a dispute settle-
ment provision.39 Maffezini, an Argentinean, brought a claim before 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”) regarding the treatment he received for an investment deal-
ing with a chemical distribution company in Spain.40 Spain objected 
to ICSID’s jurisdiction because Maffezini had failed to comply with 
Article X of the Argentina-Spain BIT, which allowed access to interna-
tional arbitration only if a competent domestic tribunal rendered a deci-
sion that failed to resolve the dispute or eighteen months of litigation 
passed—whichever came first. 41 Maffezini asserted that this procedural 
cooling period did not apply because the MFN clause allowed him to 
attach to the Chile-Spain BIT that contained no such required cooling 
period.42 The Tribunal concluded that “dispute settlement arrangements 
are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors” and per-
mitted Maffezini to proceed with his claim.43
C. Modern Jurisprudence Subsequent to Maffezini
1. Cases Against MFN Application to Dispute Settlement 
Provisions
The first major case to come out in opposition to Maffezini was 
Tecmed v. Mexico44 in 2003. In Tecmed, the Tribunal refused to allow 
the claimant to access provisions in other treaties that would allow him 
to bring claims based on conditions precedent to the basic treaty and 
avoid the three-year time limit on claims.45 The Tribunal declared that 
it should be presumed that the parties to a treaty specifically negotiated 
38 ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 45 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 
IcsID rep. 396 (2002).
39 Id.
40 Id. ¶ 1.
41 Id. ¶ 8.
42 Id. ¶ 39.
43 Id. ¶ 54.
44 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of Tribunal (May 29, 2003), 19 IcsID rev. 158 (2004).
45 Id. ¶ 69.
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for the dispute settlement provisions, and thus that the parties would not 
have entered into the agreement had it not been for those provisions.46
Several tribunals have followed Tecmed and denied claimants access 
to more favorable dispute settlement provisions through the MFN 
clause. For example, in Salini v. Jordan,47 the Italian claimant attempted 
to bring a claim before ICSID regarding a dispute over the final pay-
ment due to two Italian construction companies.48 The relevant bilat-
eral investment treaty, however, allowed for ICSID arbitration only in 
instances of treaty violation.49 If a contract provided for another form of 
dispute settlement, that clause would prevail.50 The claimant, however, 
sought arbitration under ICSID based on Jordan’s treaty with the United 
States that allowed parties to bring contractual disputes before ICSID.51 
The Tribunal, claiming it lacked jurisdiction, refused to rule on the mer-
its of the case.52
The Tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria53 seemingly attempted to undo 
what the Maffezini Tribunal had started.54 The basic treaty under 
question—the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT—had been negotiated while 
Bulgaria was under communist control, and generally did not allow 
46 Id.
47 ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction (Nov. 9, 
2004), 20 IcsID rev. 148 (2005), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC635_
En&caseId=C218.
48 Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
49 Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
50 The investment contract at issue indeed required for disputes to be settled in 
Jordanian courts unless the parties agreed to a different form of settlement. Id. ¶ 71.
51 Id. ¶ 21.
52 See id. ¶ 119 (denying jurisdiction because the most-favored-nation clause did not 
apply to dispute settlement provisions). 
53 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005), 20 IcsID 
rev. 262 (2005).
54 See Vesel, supra note3, at 173 (“If Salini applied the brakes to the idea that MFN 
clauses should be interpreted as being presumptively applicable to dispute settlement 
provisions, then the Tribunal in Plama sought to reverse course, arguing in favor of a 
presumptively narrow interpretation of MFN clauses.”).
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for international arbitration.55 Regardless, the claimant sought to bring 
a dispute before ICSID through the MFN clause.56 The Tribunal both 
denied the claimant’s arguments57 and broadly denounced the principle 
that Maffezini had established.58
Many other cases have denied a claimant the ability to import 
more favorable dispute settlement provisions through a most-favored-
nation clause. Examples of such cases include: using the MFN clause 
to import the entry into the force date of another treaty,59 bringing a 
claim for breach of fair-and-equitable treatment as provided by other 
bilateral investment treaties concluded by one of the States party to the 
basic treaty,60 expansion of the types of claims that could be submitted 
to arbitration,61 and broadening the subject matter scope of a tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.62
2. Cases Supporting MFN Application to Dispute 
Settlement Provisions
Others, however, have continued the fight against a restrictive 
interpretation of Maffezini and have applied the MFN clause to dispute 
55 The Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT only provided for arbitration if a domestic court 
concluded that expropriation had occurred and a dispute existed regarding the amount 
of compensation due to the claimant. Agreement between The Government of the 
People’s Republic of Bulgaria and The Government of the Republic of Cyprus on 
Mutual Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Bulg.-Cyprus, ¶ 187, published 
in State Gazette No. 108/24.12.1993, in force since May 18, 1988 [hereinafter Bulg.-
Cyprus BIT].
56 Plama, 20 IcsID rev. 262, ¶ 1.
57 See id. ¶ 227 (holding that the most-favored-nation clause cannot create jurisdiction 
under ICSID). 
58 See id. ¶ 224 (lamenting that the Maffezini Tribunal “attempt[ed] to neutralize 
such a provision that is nonsensical from a practical point of view”). 
59 M.C.I. Power Grp., L.C. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, 
Decision on the Application for Annulment (July 31, 2007).
60 Telenor Mobile Commc’ns A.S. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/15, Award (Sept. 13, 2006), 21 IcsID rev. 603 (2006).
61 See Berschader v. Russian Fed’n, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award of Apr. 21, 
2006, ¶ 179 (Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce) (limiting 
possible claims to determining the proper amount and mode paid in expropriation 
claims).
62 Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Competence (June 19, 2009).
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settlement provisions. Siemens v. Argentina63 was an important exten-
sion of Maffezini because, even though it involved a narrower MFN 
clause than Maffezini,64 the Tribunal nonetheless allowed it to extend 
to dispute settlement provisions.65 Closely resembling Maffezini, this 
case involved an Argentinean treaty that required a claimant to submit 
to domestic litigation for a period of time prior to pursuing international 
arbitration.66 The Tribunal ignored Argentina’s attempt to distinguish 
from Maffezini based on the narrow clause and grounded its interpreta-
tion in the VCLT.67 The Tribunal also considered the issue of importing 
certain sections of the dispute settlement provisions and not others, and 
concluded that such “cherry-picking” was permissible.68
Argentina’s bilateral investment treaties have proven to be the larg-
est source of unrest regarding MFN clauses in BITs, as at least five 
prominent decisions involved Argentina as a party. The first, Camuzzi 
v. Argentina,69 added little to the discourse but was notable because 
Argentina did not bother to argue that the claimant could not use the 
MFN clause to invoke more favorable dispute settlement provisions.70 
63 Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 81 (Aug. 3, 2004).
64 See Tratado entre la República Federal de Alemania y la República Argentina 
sobre Promoción y Protección Reciproca de Inversiones [Treaty Between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Republic of Argentina Regarding the Reciprocal 
Promotion and Protection of Investments], Arg.-Ger., arts., 3(1)–(2), Apr. 9, 1991 
[hereinafter Arg.-Ger. BIT] (applying “treatment no less favorable” both investments 
(3(1)) and activities related to investments (3(2))). Unless otherwise noted, all BITs are 
available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx.
65 See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶¶ 85, 103 (interpreting “treatment” as 
referring to treatment generally, and holding that “activities related to the investments” 
is broad enough to include dispute settlement provisions). 
66 Id. ¶ 51.
67 See id. ¶ 81 (prefacing analysis with the statement that the treaty should be 
interpreted according to the Vienna Convention, and neither more liberally nor 
restrictively than provided for in that treaty); see also Vesel, supra note3, at 164–65 
(noting the Tribunal also considered context in regard to the Vienna Convention more 
than Maffezini had).
68 See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶ 109 (“[C]laiming a benefit by the 
operation of an [most-favored-nation] clause does not carry with it the acceptance 
of all the terms of the treaty which provides for such benefit whether or not they are 
considered beneficial to the party making the claim.”).
69 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/7, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 10, 2005).
70 Id. ¶ 17.
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The Gas Natural v. Argentina71 Tribunal strongly affirmed the propo-
sition that had been suggested in Maffezini: that dispute settlement 
protections are “essential to a regime of protection of foreign direct 
investment.”72 National Grid v. Argentina73 rejected outright Plama’s 
encouragement of consistently applying a narrow construction of MFN 
clauses in dispute settlement provisions instances.74 Suez v. Argentina75 
refused to apply either a narrow or a broad base to the MFN clause, but 
rather concluded through basic treaty interpretation that the claimant 
was entitled to the more favorable provision contained in a third party 
treaty.76 The most recent addition to the MFN clause debate is the 2011 
Award in Impregilo v. Argentina,77 in which the Tribunal rejected the 
respondent’s objections to its jurisdiction and ruled that the claimant 
could use the MFN clause contained in the basic treaty to access the 
more favorable Argentina-U.S. BIT that provided him a choice between 
international and domestic arbitration when the basic treaty did not pro-
vide a choice.78
D. A Primer in Treaty Interpretation
In the chaos created by BITs and their MFN clauses, one must 
remember that interpretation of BITs is governed by Articles 31 and 32 
71 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 17, 2005).
72 Id. ¶ 29.
73 June 20, 2006, (UNCITRAL).
74 Id. ¶ 92.
75 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction (May 16, 2006).
76 Id. ¶ 64.
77 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17 (June 21, 
2011).
78 Id. ¶ 98-101. Professor Brigette Stern wrote a scathing dissent lambasting the 
application of MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions and warning of the “great 
dangers” of doing so. Id. The dissent has caused new fervor around the debate regarding 
the MFN clause’s application. See Mike McClure, Most Favoured Nation Clauses – 
No favoured view on how they should be interpreted, Kluwer International, available 
at http://kluwer.practicesource.com/blog/2011/most-favoured-nation-clauses-–-no-
favoured-view-on-how-they-should-be-interpreted/.
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of the VCLT, provided that both parties are states party to the VCLT.79 
Article 31 instructs the interpreter to emphasize the text itself, joined 
with a teleological approach.80 Article 32 allows for the subjective intent 
of the parties to be considered when interpretation based on Article 
31 would lead to an “ambiguous or obscure” or “manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable result,” or merely to confirm the conclusion reached under 
Article 31.81
Despite the VCLT’s attempt to lay out the proper method for treaty 
interpretation, there are still three commonly acknowledged and distinct 
styles of interpreting treaties. The first is textualism, which places the 
most emphasis on the words of the treaties themselves and their common 
meaning.82 The second is intentionalism, which looks to the intentions 
of the drafters at the time they formed the treaty.83 In international law, 
this includes examining the travaux préparatoires,84 or the negotiating 
79 Vienna Convention, supra note 19, arts. 31, 32. To date, 111 States have ratified 
Most Favoured Nation Clauses – No favored view on how they should be interpreted 
under the Vienna Convention, and many other States recognize its provisions as 
binding under customary international law. See Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 vA. J. Int’l l. 431, 443 (2004) 
(voicing that although the Vienna Convention is not binding as a matter of domestic 
treaty law, “many of the principles codified in the Convention have force nonetheless 
as expressions of customary international law”); Rubins supra note 20, at 214 (calling 
the Vienna Convention “the most authoritative statement of customary international 
law in the area of treaty interpretation”). 
80 See Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 31 (“[a] treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”).
81 See id. art. 32 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, 
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (1) leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (2) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.”).
82 See myres s. mcDouGAl et Al., the InterpretAtIon oF InternAtIonAl AGreements 
AnD WorlD publIc orDer: prIncIples oF content AnD proceDure xviii (1994) (defining 
textuality as having “an ascription of meaning to words taken as final”). 
83 See mcDouGAl, supra note 113, at 82–83 (advancing that the suggested aim of 
interpreting treaties is to eventually understand the intent of the parties). 
84 Travaux préparatoires are defined as “[m]aterials used in preparing the ultimate 
form of an . . . international treaty.” blAck’s lAW DIctIonAry 1638 (9th ed. 2009).
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history.85 The third is commonly referred to as teleological.86 Under this 
theory, those interpreting a treaty will look at the overall purpose of the 
treaty, and then adopt the best measures to accomplish that goal.87
II. Ambiguous MFN Clauses Should Apply to Dispute Settlement 
Provisions
The outrage that cases like Maffezini have left behind them is unnec-
essary. First, as long as tribunals closely follow the analysis required 
under the VCLT—which requires analyzing the text in light of its object 
and purpose—the MFN clause can be used to its intended full extent 
and provide important added protection to BITs.88 Second, by closely 
adhering to the VCLT, arbitrators are afforded the necessary “escape 
hatch” that will allow them to restrict the MFN clauses’ applicability 
in instances of an absurd or obscure result.89 Third, absent assertions of 
fraud or duress, host states must be held to the provisions included in 
their treaties.
A. The First Step for International Arbitration Tribunals Must 
Be the Ordinary Meaning of the Text in Light of the Object 
and Purpose of the Treaty.
When a tribunal determines an MFN clauses’ scope of applicability 
to dispute settlement provisions in BITs, it must begin with an analysis 
of the plain and ordinary meaning of the words, reviewing that meaning 
85 See GArDIner, supra note 114, at 307 (citing Sir H. Wadlock, Third Report on 
the Law of Treaties, 2 y.b. Int’l l. comm’n 58, ¶ 20 (1964)) (cautioning that travaux 
préparatoires should not necessarily be seen as conclusive evidence of the intentions 
of the parties).
86 See shAW, supra note 112, at 933 (raising that many believe teleological 
interpretation usurps the judge’s role as determiners of objects and purposes of 
documents).
87 See mcDouGAl, supra note 81, at 214 (suggesting that there are two types of 
teleological interpretation: the objectives of society as a whole and the objectives of 
the individual parties).
88 See, e.g., Suez, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 64 (May 
16, 2006) (applying the traditional interpretation method to provide claimant with 
more favorable, faster access to international arbitration). 
89 See infra, notes 222–23 and accompanying text (concluding that pre-defined 
public policy considerations are unnecessary under an Article 32 analysis).
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through the lens of the object and purpose of the treaty.90 Article 31 
of the VCLT provides: “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”91 The 
International Law Commission has clarified that all elements within 
Article 31—ordinary meaning and teleological analysis—are meant to 
be read as a whole, and not subsequent to one another.92
1. Broad Clauses and the ordinary meaning of “treatment”
A typical example of a Broad Clause is one in which States simply 
accord investors “treatment no less favorable” than that provided to 
third parties.93 Consequently, it is first necessary to look to the ordinary 
meaning of the term “treatment” to determine the scope of application of 
the MFN clause.94 If treatment is deemed to include dispute settlement, 
then the MFN clause also encompasses dispute settlement provisions.
90 See ArnolD DuncAn mcnAIr, the lAW oF treAtIes 285 n.1 (1938) (insisting 
that each treaty requires an independent examination because there is no definitive 
most-favored-nation clause); see also Vesel, supra note 3, at 128 (chastising the 
generalizations made in Maffezini, Plama, and Gas Natural, and proffering instead that 
traditional rules of treaty interpretation should apply); Rubins, supra note 20, at 214 
(asserting the problem with tribunals’ interpretations thus far is that they have strayed 
from the treaty text and settled into a policy based analysis); Martins Paprinksis, MFN 
Clauses and International Dispute Settlement: Moving beyond Maffezini and Plama?, 
26 IcsID rev. vol. 2, 14, 20-21 (Fall 2011) (detailing that during the drafting of 
the Vienna Convention, the drafters consciously decided not to provide special rules 
of interpretation for MFN clauses) . Although most States are party to the Vienna 
Convention, all States are bound by its rules because it is a codification of customary 
international law. See Rubins, supra note 20, at 214 (referring to the Vienna Convention 
as “the most authoritative statement of customary international law”).
91 Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 31.
92 See International Law Commission, Reports of the Commission to the General 
Assembly, 2 y.b. Int’l l. comm’n 218, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1/1966 (1966) reprinted 
in 3 unIteD nAtIons conFerence on the lAW oF treAtIes 38 (2001) (characterizing 
the interaction between all elements in Article 31 as providing the “legally relevant 
interpretation”).
93 E.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 20, art. 3 (demanding “treatment no less 
favorable” than that accorded to third parties).
94 See Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 31(1) (requiring treaty terms to be 
interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning).
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Treatment is defined as “the act or manner of treating, as conduct 
or behavior towards another party.”95 Specifically in BITs, treatment 
is “a broad term which . . . refers to the legal regime that applies to 
investments once they have been admitted by the host State.”96 A State 
tailors its behavior towards investors in a certain way to comport with 
the substantive “treatment” required under a BIT.97 For example, a 
State could alter its conduct by more liberally granting permits for new 
businesses to accommodate a BIT that includes a national treatment 
clause. During dispute settlement, a State likewise “conducts” itself a 
certain way “towards” the investor.98 The State must make decisions 
regarding prosecution, negotiation, and settlement. Thus, the ordinary 
meaning of treatment does not appear to limit the term “treatment” to 
substantive provisions. Because Broad Clauses—which only mention 
“treatment”—are expansive in scope by nature, they require little inter-
pretation, and are the easiest type of MFN clause to extend to dispute 
settlement provisions.99
95 Webster’s neW InternAtIonAl DIctIonAry 2435 (3d ed. unabridged 2002). As the 
Vienna Convention requires interpretation according to a word’s ordinary meaning, 
Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 31(1), tribunals often use dictionaries as a 
starting point for the definition of a word, see, e.g., Alpha Projektholding GmbH 
v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Decision on Respondent’s Proposal to 
Disqualify Arbitrator Dr. Yoram Turbowicz, ¶ 37 (Mar. 19, 2010) (using Webster’s 
Dictionary to define “manifest” at the beginning of legal analysis, and stating that 
doing so is “keeping with the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention”).
96 ruDolF Dolzer & mArGrete stevens, bIlAterAl Investment treAtIes 58 (1995) 
(citations omitted).
97 See neWcombe & pArADell, supra note 20, at 203 (clarifying the important 
distinction between conduct and treatment as the former consisting of an act or 
omission and the latter referring to the final result of a State’s conduct). 
98 See Todd Weiler, Good Faith and Regulatory Transparency: The Story of 
Metalclad v. Mexico, in InternAtIonAl Investment lAW AnD ArbItrAtIon: leADInG 
cAses From the IcsID, nAFtA, bIlAterAl treAtIes AnD customAry InternAtIonAl 
lAW 701, 704 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005) (detailing that the only enforceable regulation 
of the “conduct” of states regarding the protection of rights of individuals is through 
the multitudes of bilateral investment treaties’ dispute settlement provisions).
99 The exception to this is any most-favored-nation clause that expressly provides or 
denies that it applies to dispute settlement provisions. See Vienna Convention, supra 
note 19, art. 31(4) (upholding that parties can choose to assign a specific meaning to a 
phrase).
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For “treatment” to refer only to substantive provisions, it must have 
a special meaning outside of its ordinary meaning.100 The VCLT allows 
parties to give special meanings to words,101 but requires that they be 
clear in their intention to impart a non-traditional meaning into a word 
used in the treaty.102 Where no express alternate definition is provided 
for, either in the treaty or in a supplemental agreement,103 the phrase 
“treatment” should be interpreted by its plain and ordinary meaning.104 
As illustrated above, this includes dispute settlement provisions.105
Unfortunately, the Maffezini Tribunal did not openly discuss the 
scope of the word “treatment.” The Tribunal did, however, indirectly 
consider the definition of the word “treatment” when it looked to Anglo-
Iranian Oil to determine the MFN clause’ scope.106 Interestingly, the 
Tribunal expressly mentioned Article 31 of the VCLT and the need to 
interpret all clauses in the treaty at issue in accordance with Article 31 
100 See Vesel, supra note 3, at 145–46 (relaying the argument of opponents to the 
ordinary meaning of “treatment” that, within the BIT context, “treatment” refers 
explicitly to government actions that would create an actionable claim for an investor).
101 Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 31(4) (“A special meaning shall be given 
to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”).
102 See Vesel, supra note 3, at 146 (discussing that the Vienna Convention “places the 
burden squarely on the shoulders of the party advocating the special meaning”).
103 See Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 31(3)(a) (instructing that subsequent 
agreements between parties providing further instructions for interpretation be 
considered when analyzing the text of a treaty).
104 See Vienna Convention, supra note 19 (requiring parties to interpret treaties based 
on their ordinary meaning and a teleological analysis).
105 See supra text accompanying notes 130–39 (concluding treatment is a general 
phrase referring to all forms of conduct, and thus includes dispute settlement 
provisions); see also Vesel, supra note 3, at 146 (affirming that broadly-worded treaties 
should be interpreted to include dispute settlement provisions).
106 See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 45 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 IcsID rep. 396 (2002) (determining scope to 
be “the subject matter to which the clause applies”). Perhaps the best evidence that 
the Tribunal considered the definition of “treatment” appears in paragraph fifty-four: 
“[n]otwithstanding the fact that the basic treaty containing the clause does not refer 
expressly to dispute settlement as covered by the most favored nation clause, the 
Tribunal . . . conclude[s] that today dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably 
related to the protection of foreign investors.” Id. ¶ 54. In this sentence, the Tribunal 
acknowledges that “treatment” under the basic treaty does not expressly include 
dispute settlement provisions. Id. Because the Tribunal was not provided with a list of 
what the parties intended “treatment” to cover, it presumably considered what the term 
“treatment” on its own meant. Id.
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during its analysis of Article X of the Argentina-Spain BIT, which out-
lined dispute settlement procedures.107 The Tribunal thus demonstrated 
that it both recognized Article 31 and how to correctly interpret treaty 
provisions. Regrettably and incorrectly, it failed to do so for all of the 
clauses at issue in the case.
The Siemens Tribunal provided the correct analysis, and also 
demonstrated that a MFN clause need not be as broad as the one in 
Maffezini to allow claimants access to more favorable dispute settle-
ment provisions.108 The Tribunal in Siemens began its treaty interpreta-
tion with discussion of Article 31 of the VCLT, and pledged to interpret 
the terms “neither liberally nor restrictively,” as neither term is included 
within Article 31.109 The Tribunal ultimately refused respondent’s plea 
to impart specific meanings into words for which the parties had clearly 
not provided for.110 Restraining itself to interpret the treaty according to 
its basic meaning in accord with Article 31,111 the Tribunal concluded 
that “treatment” meant “behavior in respect of an entity or a person.”112 
To complete the analysis under Article 31, the Tribunal finally concluded 
that access to dispute settlement features was part of the treatment of 
investors as defined by the purpose of the treaty.113
The Plama Tribunal had an opportunity to analyze a Broad Clause, 
and reached the wrong conclusion because it did not properly apply 
Article 31 of the VCLT. In this case, the clause in question provided: 
“Each Contracting Party shall apply to the investments in its territory 
by investors of the other Contracting Party a treatment which is not 
107 See id. ¶ 27 (failing to apply similar analysis to the most-favored-nation clause).
108 Siemens addressed a most-favored-nation clause that did not contain a clause 
indicating that it applied to “all matters subject to this agreement.” Compare Arg.-
Spain BIT, supra note 146, art. 4(1) (in all matters relating to this agreement) (author’s 
translation), with Arg.-Ger. BIT, supra note 92, arts. 3(1)–(2) (“treatment less 
favorable”) (author’s translation). 
109 Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 81 (Aug. 3, 2004).
110 See id. ¶ 106 (“[T]he term ‘treatment’ is so general that the Tribunal cannot limit 
its application except as specifically agreed by the parties.”).
111 But see Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 163 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 IcsID rep. 396 (2002) (grappling with creating 
public policy exceptions based on instinct, not treaty interpretation). 
112 See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶ 102 (demonstrating restraint from 
imparting preconceived notions about “treatment” by giving it a broad definition). 
113 See id. (adding that access to more favorable dispute settlement provisions is one 
of the benefits of a most-favored-nation clause). 
48 THE ARBITRATION BRIEF Volume 2
less favorable than that accorded to investments by investors of third 
states.”114 This MFN clause is similar to that in Siemens, though it is 
admittedly narrower in terms of language than that present in Maffezini 
because there is no expansive term included in the statement.115 Despite 
being non-expansive, the clause was also non-restrictive, and so the 
ordinary meaning of the word treatment should apply.116
The Tribunal decided that it was “not clear whether the ordinary 
meaning of the term ‘treatment’ . . . includes or excludes dispute settle-
ment” and ultimately denied the claimant’s request to import a more 
favorable dispute settlement provision from a third party treaty.117 If the 
Tribunal, however, had correctly followed the analysis required by the 
VCLT, it would have also conducted a teleological analysis after deem-
ing the ordinary meaning of “treatment” inconclusive.118 At that point, 
the Tribunal would have had an opportunity to recall that the purpose 
of the treaty in question was to “promote investment,”119 and hopefully 
concluded that the MFN clause should have been interpreted as includ-
ing dispute settlement provisions to maximize the purpose of the treaty.
2. Narrow Clauses and “treatment” under the esjudem 
generis principle
Narrow Clauses provide a non-exhaustive list of what consti-
tutes “treatment” without specifically mentioning dispute settlement 
114 Bulg.-Cyprus BIT, supra note 83.
115 Compare Maffezini, 5 IcsID rep. 396 (addressing “all matters relating to this 
agreement”), with Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005), 20 IcsID rev. 262 (2005) 
(containing no such clause).
116 See Suez, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 63–64 (May 
16, 2006) (refusing to apply a liberal or restrictive approach to a non-expansive, 
non-restrictive most-favored-nation clause); see also schIll, supra note 18, at 174 
(evaluating open-ended most-favored-nation clauses as falling first and foremost to 
interpretation under Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention). 
117 Plama, 20 IcsID rev. 262, ¶ 189.
118 See Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 31(1) (requiring both analysis of 
a phrases’ ordinary meaning and teleological analysis); see also International Law 
Commission, Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, 2 y.b. Int’l l. 
comm’n 218, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1/1966 (1966) reprinted in 3 unIteD nAtIons 
conFerence on the lAW oF treAtIes 38 (2001) (articulating that the nexus between 
textual and teleological creates the proper interpretation of treaties).
119 See Bulg.-Cyprus BIT, supra note 83, pmbl. (listing the objective of the treaty as 
“the creation of favourable conditions for investments”).
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provisions.120 In these instances, the esjudem generis principle must be 
applied to determine if dispute settlement provisions belong to the same 
category of subject as that to which the clause itself relates.121 If dispute 
settlement provisions are deemed to be in the same category, then the 
MFN clause will apply to these provisions.
For example, the Germany-Thailand BIT provides a non-exhaustive 
list immediately following its MFN clause to demonstrate what the par-
ties intend “treatment” to mean.122 The only non-specific term included 
in that list is “any other measures having similar effects.”123 If a tribunal 
looking at this type of provision were to allow a party to access more 
favorable dispute settlement provisions contained in another treaty, it 
would have to first determine that the parties intended the clause “any 
other measures having similar effects” to include dispute settlement 
provisions. The preceding defined list includes purchase of materials 
of production and marketing of products within the host State.124 This 
list can be viewed narrowly or broadly. Broadly, it could be argued that 
Germany and Thailand intended to only include treatment once the 
investor is already in the country, as the list does not address unequal 
treatment in granting entry to the country. As dispute settlement only 
occurs once the investor is already in the host State, dispute settlement 
provisions could fall under the MFN clause.125 If this list were to be 
120 E.g., North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1103(1)–(2), U.S.-Can.-Mex., 
Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.l.m. 289 (1993) (providing non-exhaustive lists 
of specific situations in which most-favored-nation treatment should be accorded to 
investors and investments, without mentioning dispute settlement mechanisms).
121 See supra note 50 (specifying that the esjudem generis principle requires that any 
term at the end of a list be interpreted so that it fits within the previous terms).
122 See Treaty between the Kingdom to Thailand and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
art. 3(2), June 24, 2002 [hereinafter Ger.-Thai. BIT], (defining treatment as restrictions 
on purchase of materials, energy, fuel, or any kind of means of production, impeding 
the market of a particular product, or “any other measures having similar effects”).
123 Id.
124 Id. art. 3(2).
125 Even if the esjudem generis principle as applied restricted the most-favored-nation 
clause application to events occurring once already in the State, dispute settlement 
provisions could reasonably be included in this category, as entry into the marketplace 
is a pre-requisite to filing a claim. See also, neWcombe & pArADell, supra note 20, 
at 204 (admitting that the esjudem generis rule is difficult to apply generally, and that 
most-favored-nation clauses provide additional strife for interpreters because of their 
wide variances). 
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read narrowly—for example, to only include transactions—then dispute 
settlement procedures may be outside the purview of the MFN clause.
The Salini Tribunal addressed a Narrow Clause.126 The Italy-Jordan 
BIT, in a subsection after the general MFN treatment clause, provides:
All the activities relating to the procurement, sale and 
transport of raw and processed materials, energy, fuels 
and production means shall be accorded . . . no less 
favourable treatment than the one accorded to similar 
activities taken by . . . investors of Third States. The 
provisions of this article shall also apply to the activities 
connected with an investment.127
The Tribunal ultimately concluded that the claimant could not access 
the more favorable dispute settlement provision contained in the U.S.-
Jordan and U.K.-Jordan BITs through the basic treaty’s MFN clause.128
The Tribunal could have applied the MFN clause to dispute settle-
ment provisions, had it decided that “the activities connected with an 
investment” included dispute settlement provisions.129 Again, whether 
dispute settlement provisions are determined to fall under the MFN 
clause will depend largely on whether the terms were decided broadly 
or narrowly.130 The inclusion of the “shall also apply” phrase followed 
by the broad “all activities connected with the investment,” supports a 
126 See Agreement between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
and the Government of the Italian Republic on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, It.–Jordan, art. 3(1), July 21, 1996 [hereinafter It.-Jordan BIT] (limiting 
the most-favored-nation clause to claims “within the bounds of their own territory 
shall grant investments effected by, and the income accruing to”).
127 Id. art. 3(4). This article may provide for a more difficult application of the esjudem 
generis principle because the “open clause” appears in a new sentence, and not at the 
end of a list of restrictive terms. 
128 See Salini Construttori & Italstrade v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/13, ¶ 119, Decision on Jurisdiction (Nov. 29, 2004), 20 IcsID rev. 148 
(2005) (misinterpreting the most-favored-nation clause because it did not provide an 
expansive “in all matters” clause similar to that in Maffezini).
129 The list restricts which areas of the treaty to which the most-favored-nation clause 
can apply. Id. The first three clauses do not include any mention of dispute settlement 
provisions. Id. Thus, a tribunal would have to find that the one expansive clause—“any 
other measures having similar effects”—provides a basis to apply the most-favored-
nation clause to the dispute settlement provision. 
130 Broadly or narrowly, the clause must still be interpreted according to its ordinary 
meaning and in light of its object and purpose. Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 
31(1). 
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finding that the MFN clause was intended to cover all provisions in the 
treaty, even procedural ones.131 “All activities connected with an invest-
ment” seems to plainly include dispute settlement clauses.132 Because 
the VCLT requires words to be interpreted based on their plain mean-
ing, the Tribunal erred by imparting previously decided meanings onto 
the words of the treaty.133
3. Ordinary meaning viewed in light of the object and 
purpose of the treaty
Article 31 of the VCLT requires treaty interpreters not only to look 
at the ordinary meaning of the text of the treaty, but also requires inter-
preters to look at that text in light of the “object and purpose” of the 
treaty.134 The purpose of any treaty is typically listed in the preamble, 
which in itself may not give rise to affirmative duties, but when viewed 
through the lens of the MFN clause, may create duties to treat States 
party to the treaty the same as third party States.135 The typical purpose 
of a BIT is for parties to mutually encourage and protect the invest-
ments made by one another.136 Because the substantive provisions in a 
BIT further the purpose of the treaty—to promote and protect invest-
ments—it follows that any discrepancy in the text should be interpreted 
131 See GArDIner, supra note 114, at 144 (describing terms as the starting point for 
treaty interpretation).
132 Through an “ordinary meaning” analysis, Vienna Convention, supra note 19, 
art. 31(1), an interpreter would likely determine that because “connected with” is 
substantially vague, Webster’s neW InternAtIonAl DIctIonAry 480 (3d ed. unabridged 
2002) (defining connected as “having the parts or elements logically related”), and 
because this vague term is simultaneously coupled with the broad phrase “all activities,” 
it would include dispute settlement as an “activity” “connected with” investments.
133 See schIll, supra note 18, at 146 (demanding that the most-favored-nation clause 
only be interpreted according the Vienna Convention without prior tainting by a 
tribunal).
134 See Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
135 See id. at 189 (stating that prefatory statements do not often create affirmative 
duties, except possibly those to provide treatment as favorable as that given to third 
parties to the claimant). 
136 See id. at 188 (contending that all bilateral investment treaties are based on 
the belief that foreign direct investment is beneficial to both states involved in the 
agreement).
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to also promote and protect investments. Consequently, MFN clauses 
would include dispute settlement provisions.
Despite arriving at the right conclusion through flawed reasoning,137 
the Maffezini Tribunal’s interpretation remains within the bounds of the 
“object and purpose” of the Argentina-Spain BIT.138 Specifically, the 
listed purpose—to create favorable conditions for investments—gener-
ally requires States to adjust policies to encourage and protect invest-
ments.139 Dispute settlement provisions are a crucial part in attaining 
this goal, and should therefore be included under MFN treatment.140 
The Maffezini Tribunal itself stated: “dispute settlement arrangements 
are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors.”141 An 
investor is more likely to invest if he knows that he would have unfet-
tered access to a neutral international forum if a dispute arose.142 The 
Maffezini Tribunal thus admirably engaged in a teleological analysis to 
determine whether exhaustion of local remedies was required prior to 
the claimant being able to access ICSID, but regrettably did not pro-
vide a similar analysis to the MFN clause and its ability to import more 
favorable dispute settlement provisions.143
The Siemens Tribunal more accurately comported with the VCLT. 
In its initial analysis of the MFN clause, the Tribunal noted that it would 
be “guided by the purpose . . . ‘to protect’ and ‘to promote’ investments 
137 See infra text accompanying notes 231–36 (condemning Maffezini’s superfluous 
restrictions based in public policy considerations).
138 See, Arg.-Spain BIT, supra note 146, pmbl. (articulating that the parties formed 
the treaty based on a mutual desire to increase economic cooperation and create 
favorable conditions for investments).
139 See sornArAJAh supra note 2, at 189 (providing that preambles, while not binding, 
can create an affirmative duty to provide most-favored-nation treatment).
140 See Gas Natural SDG S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 29 (June 17, 2005) (describing arbitration provisions as 
“perhaps the most crucial element” in the “bundle of protections granted to foreign 
investors by host states”). 
141 Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 54 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 IcsID rep. 396 (2002). 
142 See generally Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 6 (concluding that bilateral 
investment treaties promote foreign direct investment by providing stability and 
insurance for investors). 
143 See Maffezini, 5 IcsID rep. 396, ¶ 27 (failing to extend proper Vienna Convention 
interpretation to all portions of the treaty after demonstrating the Tribunal’s capability 
to do so). 
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. . . as expressed in [the treaty’s] title and preamble.”144 The Tribunal’s 
awareness of its duty to interpret the treaty “in light of its object and 
purpose”145 may explain why the Tribunal concluded that “treatment” 
necessarily included dispute settlement mechanisms even though the 
MFN clause at issue was arguably narrower than that in Maffezini.146 
By assuring the claimant-investor quick access to a neutral forum,147 the 
Tribunal indirectly encouraged others to invest.148 Through short and 
simple consideration, the Tribunal furthered the object and purpose of 
the treaty by extending the MFN clause to the dispute settlement provi-
sions at issue.149 This analysis is one that future tribunals would benefit 
from following.
B. Article 32 Provides the Necessary “Out” for Tribunals to 
Avoid Using the MFN Clause to Create Jurisdiction
As previously discussed, Article 32 of the VCLT allows treaty inter-
preters to engage in an intentionalist analysis only to confirm the mean-
ing drawn from the ordinary meaning of the words and their purpose, 
or if that meaning creates a manifestly absurd result.150 Tribunals need 
only look to Article 32 for the ideal loophole through which to escape if 
asked to use an MFN clause for a manifestly absurd reason.151
However, the MFN clause should not apply in all situations. There 
are instances in which claimants should never be able to use the MFN 
clause to access more favorable provisions in third party treaties. For 
144 Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 81 (Aug. 3, 2004).
145 Id.; see also Arg.-Ger. BIT, supra note 92, pmbl. (“[W]ith the goal of creating 
favorable conditions for the investments of the nationals or societies of one State 
within the bounds of the other State.”) (author’s translation). 
146 See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB 02/8, ¶ 103 (admitting the formulation of the 
most-favored-nation clause in the basic treaty is narrower than that in Maffezini, and 
nonetheless concluding “that the term ‘treatment’ and the phrase ‘activities related to 
the investments’ are sufficiently wide to include settlement of disputes”).
147 See id. ¶ 78 (allowing the investor to bypass the eighteen month waiting period).
148 See supra note 194 and accompanying text (acknowledging that increased 
protection of investors through bilateral investment treaties encourages investment).
149 See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB 02/8, ¶¶ 102–03 (protecting investors rights 
and furthering the goals of the BIT).
150 Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 32.
151 See Criddle, supra note 108, at 439–41 (finding that the threshold for judicial 
recourse to Article 32 is fairly low, and suggesting that Article 31 and 32 are to be read 
cumulatively, and not consecutively).
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example, in M.C.I. v. Ecuador,152 the claimant sought to access an earlier 
entry into force date from a third party treaty. 153 By doing so, the claim-
ant would have had an actionable claim under the basic treaty that had 
not come into force at the time the grievances began.154 Under Article 
18 of the VCLT, States have a duty to “refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty” after signing and prior to the 
entry into force date, but nowhere in the Convention does it mandate 
States to provide retroactive application of an agreement.155 As set out 
by the Rights of U.S. Nationals Tribunal over sixty years ago, both the 
basic treaty and the more favorable third party treaty must be valid and 
in force for the MFN clause to have any effect.156 States should there-
fore not be able to create a valid treaty where none exists by way of the 
MFN clause.157 Consequently, allowing a State to import an earlier entry 
into force date leads to a manifestly absurd result, and thus the M.C.I. 
Tribunal was correct in denying claimant access to this provision.
The Maffezini Tribunal tried to resist against these over-extensions 
of the MFN clause by articulating multiple public policy considerations 
that would prohibit access to more favorable provisions in certain 
instances.158 Although the Tribunal correctly limited some things, such 
as clauses requiring a specific arbitration forum or specific procedural 
152 M.C.I. Power Grp., L.C. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, 
Decision on the Application for Annulment, Sec. B (July 31, 2007).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 18; cf. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran) 
1952 I.c.J. 93 (establishing that the most-favored-nation clause can confer no benefit 
to third parties once a treaty has come to an end).
156 See Anglo-Iranian Oil, 1952 I.c.J. 93 (asserting that Iran is only bound to 
obligations under the treaty so long as it is in force). 
157 See M.C.I. Power Grp., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6 (depriving claimant of the 
ability to use the most-favored-nation clause to import that entry into force date of 
another treaty, such that the alleged improper actions would be covered by the treaty).
158 See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 63 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 IcsID rep. 396 (2002) (recommending, 
unnecessarily, that exceptions be carved out for all most-favored-nation clauses). 
Examples of public policy considerations listed by the Maffezini Tribunal as situations 
in which the most-favored-nation clause may not be used are: exhaustion of local 
remedies; a “fork in the road” provision; and clauses requiring a specific arbitration 
forum or specific dispute settlement rules of arbitration. Id. 
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rules of arbitration, it was more by luck than design.159 The Tribunal 
went on to limit the MFN clause beyond what would have been a proper 
stopping point under Article 31 of the VCLT, which requires only that 
the treaty be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words 
and in light of the treaty’s purpose.160 The Tribunal stated that a require-
ment to exhaust local remedies could not be avoided by invoking a MFN 
clause, and that any “fork in the road” provision—such that parties are 
required to submit their claim to either domestic courts or international 
arbitration, but not both—was deemed “too far” for the MFN clause’s 
reach.161
Instead, these types of dispute settlement provisions are an ideal 
situation in which to invoke an MFN clause. The Tribunal, by its own 
admission, stated that “dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably 
related to the protection of foreign investors,” and that creating protec-
tion is the purpose of BITs.162 If the Tribunal is right in this statement, 
then it is logical to afford investors every type of protection that can be 
reasonably interpreted under Article 31 of the VCLT.163 The public pol-
icy considerations suggested by Maffezini are unnecessary if a proper 
analysis of the VCLT is applied.
159 See id. (circumscribing the most-favored-nation clause to the same degree which 
it would have been under an Article 32 analysis). 
160 Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 31(1). The Maffezini Tribunal, however, 
dreamt up “public policy exceptions” to restrain the new doctrine that they had just 
created moments before. See Maffezini, 5 IcsID rep. 396, ¶ 70 (basing the public 
policy exceptions on independent reasoning, not previous authority); see also schIll 
supra note 12, at 188 (flouting that the only possible explanation for the Tribunal’s 
“public policy exceptions” is the consent of the States party to the treaty, and as such, 
need not be called “public policy exceptions”); neWcombe & pArADell, supra note 20, 
at 217 (condemning the Maffezini Tribunal for creating “public policy” limitations that 
were unsupported by the Vienna Convention). 
161 See Maffezini, 5 IcsID rep. 396, ¶ 63 (enumerating a few unsubstantiated 
limitations placed on the most-favored-nation clauses).
162 Id. ¶ 54.
163 By wandering away from the Vienna Convention analysis, the Tribunal lost sight 
of the object and purpose of the treaty, and placed too much limitation on the most-
favored-nation clause. If the goal of bilateral investment treaties is to protect investors, 
and dispute settlement provisions are inextricably linked to protection of investors, 
then it logically follows that any ambiguities in treaty language should be decided 
in favor of the purpose of the treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 19, arts. 31, 32; 
accord Dolzer & stevens, supra note 133 (affirming that any ambiguity in language 
should be resolved in the way that would most benefit the protection of the investor).
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C. States Must be Held to the Provisions of Their Treaties
Tribunals must remember that bilateral treaties are essentially con-
tracts between two States, and that parties to a contract are held to the 
clauses included in that contract.164 Thus, as long as two States include 
an MFN clause in their investment treaty, they must be held accountable 
for it.165 Doing so will not fragment the international investment com-
munity beyond functionality. As reliance on this doctrine for reviewing 
substantive provisions has shown, this use of the MFN clause leads to 
very workable solutions for providing increased protection to investors.
Tribunals must hold parties accountable for the clauses they include 
in their treaties.166 Because MFN treatment is not required by customary 
international law,167 an MFN clause in a treaty is voluntarily and con-
sciously added by the drafters of the treaty.168 Further, absent evidence 
of coercion, States are presumed to have read and understood all of the 
provisions in the treaty.169
In practice, however, many tribunals do not make States responsible 
for the clauses included in their treaties. There are two frequently cited 
reasons for not holding States accountable for the clauses they chose 
to include in their treaties. First, several tribunals have asserted that 
applying the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions would create 
164 See generally 1 sAmuel WIllIston & rIchArD A. lorD, A treAtIse on the lAW oF 
contrActs § 1:1 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1999) (defining “contract” as a promise, that 
if broken, will be redressed). 
165 See Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 11 (establishing that States manifest 
their intent to be bound by the terms of a treaty through “signature, exchange of 
instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by 
any other means if so agreed”).
166 See Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 11 (codifying that when States sign, 
ratify, accept, approve or exchange notes constituting a treaty, they manifest their 
agreement to be bound to its terms).
167 See Dolzer & schreuer, supra note 24, at 186 (delineating that, as there is no 
consistent, widespread practice based on opinion juris, most-favored-nation treatment 
cannot be customary). If most-favored-nation treatment were customary international 
law, then States party to a treaty would not need to include a clause saying as much 
in a treaty. Nonetheless, States would be required to follow the general premise of 
most-favored-nation treatment. See also schIll, supra note 12, at 122 (proffering that 
the most-favored-nation clause actually works against customary international law by 
preventing States from entering in quid pro quo bargains, a customarily used tactic). 
168 See Banifatemi supra note 16, at 270 (maintaining that the most-favored-nation 
clause itself must be specifically negotiated for). 
169 sornArAJAh, supra note 2, at 179. 
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uncertainty among the international investment community.170 Second, 
tribunals have expressed concern that claimants will begin treaty-
shopping to piece together their ideal treaty, destroying the treaties that 
States work diligently to create.171
Although the most cited reason for denying MFN clause application 
to dispute settlement provisions is the creation of uncertainty,172 this 
fear does not justify failure to hold a State to the words of its treaty.173 
More than ten years after the Maffezini decision, it is safe to say there 
is no longer a “threat” of uncertainty, but that in fact the uncertainty 
already exists.174 Indeed, even nations who think they have guarded 
themselves against the “invasion” of the MFN clause may be wrong. 
For example, the United States did not believe that the expansion of the 
MFN clause would be a problem for its BITs—specifically in its 1994 
and 2004 model—because of the specific language provided in each.175 
170 E.g., Telenor Mobile Commc’ns A.S. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/15, Award, ¶ 91 (Sept. 13, 2006), 21 IcsID rev. 603 (2006) (disregarding 
the Vienna Convention’s forms of interpretation and listing the creation of uncertainty 
and instability as a “compelling reason” not to allow the most-favored-nation clause to 
apply to dispute settlement provisions).
171 E.g., Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 63 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 IcsID rep. 396 (2002) (distinguishing between 
legitimate extensions of benefits and unchecked treaty shopping that could destroy the 
“policy objectives underlying specific treaty provisions”). 
172 See, e.g., Telenor, 21 IcsID rev. 603, ¶ 94 (“[T]he wide interpretation [of a 
most-favored-nation clause] also generates both uncertainty and instability in that at 
one moment the limitation in the basic BIT is operative and at the next moment it is 
overridden by a wider dispute resolution clause in a new [treaty] entered into by the 
host State.”)
173 See schIll supra note 18, at 123 (recommending that broad use of the most-
favored-nation clause actually promotes certainty and harmonization of treatment 
afforded to investors). 
174 Maffezini was not an outlier case. Over half-a-dozen prominent arbitration 
decisions issued in the last decade declare that the most-favored-nation clause can 
apply to dispute settlement provisions. E.g., Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 3, 2004) (applying the 
most-favored-nation clause even when the clause does not contain an expansive 
phrase). Thus, it cannot be said that the threat of one outlier case has come and gone. 
This idea will remain until it is settled. 
175 See Vesel, supra note 3, at 133 (charging that the U.S. acted out of concern for 
dispute settlement predictability rather than out of a desire to restrict arbitration 
options for investors, and thus may not have created the clearest most-favored-nation 
clause possible). 
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A Tribunal in the Suez & Vivendi v. Argentina176 decision, however, 
allowed the claimant to access more favorable dispute settlement provi-
sions through a MFN clause that consisted of language nearly identical 
to that used in the U.S. Model BIT.177
The uncertainty that already exists178 regarding the general applica-
tion of the MFN clause can be remedied by adopting a policy that MFN 
clauses always apply to dispute settlement provisions.179 Resolving the 
uncertainty in favor of restricting the MFN clause to substantive provi-
sions is only a step back in terms of investor protection.180 Rather than 
fight this so-called “expansion” of the MFN clause, States should look 
176 Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 3, 2006), 21 
IcsID rev. 342.
177 Compare Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-U.K., art. 3, Dec. 11, 1990 [hereinafter 
Arg.-U.K. BIT] (delineating that the most-favored-nation clause applies to the 
“management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments”), with U.S. 
Model BIT, supra note 20 (providing that the most-favored-nation clause contained 
therein applies to “the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation and sale of other disposition of covered instruments”).
178 See neWcombe & pArADell, supra note 20, at 218 (positing that “uncertainty is 
likely to continue until states clarify the scope of MFN clauses”). Compare Wintershall 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award (Dec. 8, 
2008) , http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC1492_En&caseId=C39 (declining to extend MFN clause to 
dispute settlement provisions), with Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 (interpreting 
the same treaty as that in Wintershall but holding that “the term ‘treatment’ and the 
phrase ‘activities related to the investments’ [in the MFN clause] are sufficiently wide 
to include settlement of disputes”).
179 Because States wishing to expressly manifest their desire for the most-favored-
nation clause to apply to dispute settlement provisions would likely be required to create 
a new document providing as such, this adaptation of previous bilateral investment 
treaties does not contradict the notion that each provision must be bargained for by 
the parties. This Article does not purport that States can unilaterally decide the fate of 
the scope of their most-favored-nation clauses contained in their bilateral investment 
treaties.
180 See schIll, supra note 18, at 152 (intimating that restrictive interpretation of 
bilateral investment treaties “impede[s] the enforcement of rights granted under” that 
by causing “delay[s of] efficient dispute settlement”). 
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at it as an opportunity to expand the protection afforded to investors and 
investments.181
States can—and should—clarify the proper interpretation of the 
MFN clause in their treaties.182 The U.K. has admirably included a note 
clarifying that the MFN clause is intended to apply to dispute settlement 
provisions in its Model BIT.183 After the Siemens decision, Argentina 
and Panama exchanged diplomatic notes clarifying that they do not 
intend the MFN clause to apply to dispute settlement provisions.184 
These ex-post diplomatic notes will still be relevant if the treaty were 
to ever come before an arbitration panel, because the VCLT allows all 
subsequent agreements regarding the interpretation of the treaty to be 
taken into account.185 The United States has altered several of its BITs 
to demonstrate that the MFN clause does not apply to dispute settlement 
provisions.186 Switzerland has included an annex in its BIT concluded 
with Columbia that the MFN clause contained therein would not apply 
to dispute settlement provisions.187
181 To date, only a few States have expressly stated their stance on the most-favored-
nation clause’s applicability to dispute settlement provisions. Compare U.K. Model 
BIT, supra note 35, art. 3(3) (including dispute settlement provisions in the most-
favored-nation clause), with Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Peru for 
the Protection and Promotion of Investments, Can.-Peru, Annex B.4, Nov. 14, 2006 
[hereinafter Can.-Peru BIT] (denying most-favored-nation clause applicability to 
dispute settlement provisions). Although this Article suggests that States embrace the 
most-favored-nation clause as applying to dispute settlement provisions, if uncertainty 
is the main cause of concern for investors and States, then it is better for States to 
clarify either way, rather than leave the scope of their treaties ambiguous. 
182 See Vesel, supra note 3, at 189 (imploring States to clarify the intended scope of 
their most-favored-nation clauses as quickly and clearly as possible). 
183 U.K. Model BIT, supra note 35, art. 3(3).
184 See Nat’l Grid plc v. Argentine Republic, June 20, 2006, ¶ 85 (UNCITRAL) 
(contrasting this renunciation of the most-favored-nation clauses’ application to 
dispute settlement provisions with the U.K.’s express agreement to that end). 
185 Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 31(3)(a). 
186 Can.-Peru BIT, supra note 264, Annex B.4 (“For greater clarity . . . [MFN 
Treatment] does not encompass dispute resolution mechanisms.”).
187 See Swiss Federal Council, Dispatch to the Swiss Parliament regarding the 
Agreements on the Promotion and Protection of Investments with Serbia and 
Montenegro, Guyana, Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia and Colombia, Sept. 22, 2006, 
Official Gazette 8455, 8460, available at http:/www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2006/8455.pdf 
(announcing that most-favored-nation treatment no longer “encompasses mechanisms 
for the settlement of investment disputes”).
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The second most cited reason for denying MFN application to dis-
pute settlement provisions, “treaty shopping,” does not excuse adopting 
an inherently narrow interpretation of MFN clauses and consequently 
limiting them to substantive provisions. Opponents of the MFN clause’s 
application to dispute settlement provisions point out that it encourages 
“treaty shopping.”188 The fear is that claimants could pluck more favor-
able clauses from any existing treaty.
The Article asserts this is precisely what the MFN clause is designed 
to do.189 The MFN clause makes it so that no treaty can be isolated from 
all others, and that any treaty containing a MFN clause is connected to 
all other valid treaties made with the other State party to the treaty.190 
The MFN clause is, by definition, a promise by the States party to a 
treaty that they will provide treatment to one another that is at least 
as favorable as the treatment provided to all other treaties.191 For the 
MFN clause to work, it demands that first claimants learn of provisions 
included in other treaties. This purpose invites and encourages individu-
als governed by a certain treaty to peruse other treaties covering agree-
ments of a similar nature to find more favorable treatment, and then 
allows them to demand such treatment.192
188 See, e.g., Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 63 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 IcsID rep. 396 (2002) (misinterpreting treaty 
shopping as “play[ing] havoc on with the policy objectives of underlying specific 
treaty provisions”).
189 See schIll, supra note 18, at 187 (“Seeking the most favorable protection offered 
by the BITs of a specific host state is . . . not shopping for unwarranted advantages, 
but the core objective of MFN clauses.”); see also Rubins, supra note 20, at 222–23 
(calling the fact that the Telenor panel thought that most-favored-nation clauses should 
not operate to override provisions in bilateral investment treaties “odd”). 
190 See sornArAJAh, supra note 2, at 201 (construing the most-favored-nation 
treatment standard as external to the basic treatment as it is directly tied to standards of 
treatment in third party treaties); see Rights of Nat’ls of the United States of America in 
Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 193–94 (Aug. 27) (holding that most-favored-
nation clauses imply that when more extensive rights and privileges are granted by a 
State, these enure automatically and immediately to the benefit of other beneficiaries 
of a most-favored-nation clause).
191 See sornArAJAh, supra note 2, at 204 (suggesting that the clause can create a 
complicated system where investors can access provisions in past or future treaties).
192 See Rubins, supra note 20, at 226 (“[T]reaty shopping . . . is an important part of 
what States intend when they draft most-favored-nation clauses and include them in 
investment protection treaties.”). 
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The purpose, function, and workability of the MFN clause are dem-
onstrated by its use for substantive provisions in the treaty.193 The MFN 
clause has provided investors with more favorable substantive treatment 
by allowing access to the fair-and-equitable treatment standard,194 more 
favorable definitions of “fair value,”195 and more liberally awarding 
permits to operate a business.196 These decisions have resulted in work-
able results that provide investors with stronger protections. Even more 
interestingly, at least one commentator has suggested that dispute settle-
ment provisions have become so important to BITs that they are now 
substantive clauses.197 The substantive provisions of the treaties provide 
protection for investments, which carries out the purpose of the treaties. 
However, none of these protections would be real—or enforceable—if 
they were not also accompanied by dispute settlement provisions.198 The 
dispute settlement provisions assure that investors have redress if any of 
the rights promised them are violated.
193 See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 
Award (May 25, 2004) (involving the awarding of permits subsequent to approval of 
investment and fulfillment of contractual obligations).
194 See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Apr. 10, 2001, ¶ 117 (UNCITRAL) 
(accessing the fair-and-equitable treatment standard listed in the North American 
Free Trade Agreement); Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction (Nov. 14, 
2005) (invoking the fair-and-equitable treatment standard contained in multiple other 
bilateral investment treaties).
195 See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Mar. 14, 2003 
(UNCITRAL) (allowing the most-favored-nation clause to import a more favorable 
method of determining “fair value” in an expropriation compensation case).
196 See, e.g., MTD Equity, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7 (awarding permits subsequent 
to approval of investment and fulfillment of contractual obligations).
197 See Yannick Radi, The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the 
Dispute Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the 
‘Trojan Horse’, 18 eur. J. Int’l l. 757, 763 (2007) (“Moreover, the intellectual 
distinction between dispute settlement and substantive provisions, which is at the 
basis of the severability concept, is rendered moot by the protective dimension of the 
dispute settlement mechanism in international investment law.”).
198 See Gas Natural SDG S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 29 (June 17, 2005) (describing arbitration provisions as 
“perhaps the most crucial element” in the “bundle of protections granted to foreign 
investors by host states.”)
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Finally, treaty shopping is not necessarily an undesirable practice.199 
Treaty shopping may provide incentive for a more universal and consis-
tent approach to solving issues as they arise in the international invest-
ment community.200 It likely encourages better treatment of investors.201 
If a State knows that a claimant will be able to invoke more favorable 
provisions in other treaties through the MFN clause, then States may be 
more likely to provide that favorable treatment to third party investors 
of its own volition.202 This would ultimately lead to less litigation, and 
thus less money and time spent debating claimants’ protective rights to 
which they are entitled.203
ConClusIon
The MFN clause must be used to its proper and full potential, both 
by tribunals and by treaty drafters. To achieve this, MFN clauses can be 
invoked to import more favorable dispute settlement provisions of third 
party treaties under the VCLT.
Amid the current state of uncertainty in the international investment 
community, prudent States should clarify the scope of the MFN clauses 
contained in their BITs. They may clarify their position on current trea-
ties through additional documents. In the future, States may choose to 
expressly delineate the outer boundaries of the MFN clause in the treaty 
itself. To continue to encourage and increase the flow of foreign direct 
investment, however, continued favorable treatment towards investors 
199 See schIll, supra note 18, at 187 (inferring that most-favored-nation clauses 
allow for positive treaty-shopping that affords States and investors the ability to reach 
the most desirable protection attainable). 
200 See schIll, supra note 18, at 188 (refuting the claim that treaty shopping harms 
international relations by concluding that treaty shopping through most-favored-nation 
clauses “harmonizes compliance procedures of host States for their obligations under 
investment treaties”). 
201 See Georg Schwarzenberger, The Most-Favoured-Nation Standard in British State 
Practice, 22 brIt. y.b. Int’l l. 96, 99–100 (1945) (articulating that States bargain the 
“never-ending uneasiness” caused by the most-favored-nation clause for its creation of 
the highest possible protection that can be afforded to investors).
202 schIll supra note 18, at 123 (reasoning that bilateral investment treaties harmonize 
investor protection standards, and as the most-favored-nation clause is a ratchet in 
favor of more favorable treatment, investors would receive better treatment). 
203 schIll, supra note 18, at 193 (applauding the multilateralizational effects of the 
most-favored-nation clause and the decreased conflict and uncertainty it will ultimately 
create). 
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is absolutely necessary. The MFN clause should therefore be treated as 
a valuable tool that ensures that investors receive the highest available 
level of treatment.204
Prior to States clarifying their stance on MFN clauses, tribunals 
can aptly protect investors with the current source available to them: 
the VCLT. The VCLT allows arbitrators to generally provide claimants 
access to more favorable dispute settlement provisions in third-party 
treaties when the MFN clause allows. Article 32 of the VCLT provides 
tribunals the necessary ability to restrict application of the MFN clause 
to dispute settlement provisions in instances where doing so would pro-
vide a manifestly absurd result.
By its current design, the MFN clause provides investors with the 
protection they want, and States with the flexibility they need. The 
power to decide the fate of the clause lies with the States themselves. In 
the meantime, tribunals should stop patronizing States, and instead hold 
them accountable for the clauses included in their treaties.
204 See schIll, supra note 18, at 193 (observing that broad application of most-
favored-nation clauses to dispute settlement provisions carries the goals of bilateral 
investment treaties forward).
